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ABSTRACT
Coordination of
Time-Overcurrent Relays for
High-Speed Power Line Protection
by
Nicos Charalambous
A properly coordinated protection system is essential to ensure that an electricity
distribution network can operate within its requirements, regarding the safety of a power
system. Automatic operation is necessary to isolate faults on a power system in a
minimum time. The study of time coordination of relays suggests improved ways of power
line protection. The protection must be sensitive enough to operate when a fault occurs
under minimum fault conditions, yet be stable enough not to operate when its associated
equipment is carrying the maximum rated current, which may be a short-time value. A
power system is used as an example of time coordination of distance relays that are
responsible for clearing any possible faults. The communication of the protection relays is
associated with the backup protection which is responsible for covering the failure of the
main protection system. In addition, the reliability of the power system is improved by
establishing the right relay communication and settings.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO PROTECTION OF POWER LINES
Modern power systems have created needs that led to the expansion of the protection area
which is one of the most important fields in Power Engineering. In the protection area,
line protection has become complicated. In this study, 1 will examine the coordination of
time-overcurrent relays for phase and ground faults in order to help coordinate the
operation of the primary and the backup protection systems. Cyprus Power System will be
used for examination and study. Cyprus has a relatively small power system, however, the
transmission voltage level reaches up to 132 kV. In addition, there is going to be a study
for better "relay communication", using new techniques, in order to minimize the number
of failures of the circuit breakers. In other words, the reliability of the power system will
also be emphasized. The main aim is to maximize the instantaneous coverage of line
sections independent of system and fault-level variations and ensure high-speed line
protection.

1.1 Line classification
Since we have various voltage levels in a power system, we have to classify the lines
which connect all parts and equipment in the power system. A basic power system is
associated with the following three words: Generation, transmission and distribution.
Generation is made in low voltage levels and then the voltage is stepped up for
transmission. The final step, the distribution is made after stepping down the voltage in the

substations. According to the IEEE Power Engineering Society and Industrial Application
Society, there are the following voltage categories:
(I) 34.5kV and below

Industrial-distribution

(II) 34.5 to 138 kV Sub-transmission
(III) II5 kV and up Transmission
The last class is usually divided into three other classes:
(I) 115 kV to 230 kV

high voltage (HV)

(II) 345 kV to 765 kV

extra high voltage (EHV)

(III) 1000 kV and above

ultra high voltage (UHV)

1.2 Radial and loop
In addition, the transmission lines are also classified into two other categories: Radial lines
or feeders and loop type lines. Feeders or radial lines supply power usually to
nonsynchronous loads. In this case, the fault is supplied from the source, without any
other fault current from all other terminals. On the other hand, loop circuits are those
where for line faults, fault current is supplied from all terminals.

1.3 Protecting zones
In a power system, it is wise to separate the system into zones. As a result, we can assign
separate protection schemes of the whole power system for easier coordination. Figure
1.1 shows a classic example of zones of protection.
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Figure 1.1 Zones of protection are shown by the dashed lines.

The boundary of each zone defines a portion of the power system such that for a
fault anywhere within that zone, the protection system responsible for that zone takes
action to isolate everything within that zone from the rest of the system. We notice that in
each zone there are two circuit breakers and one or more power system components such
as generators and transformers (not shown). In addition, the zones should always overlap.
This overlap is necessary in order to cover the entire power system in terms of protection.

1.4 Protection coordination
The line protection is extending into adjacent lines and equipment such as, buses,
transformers, motors. etc. Likewise, equipment protection overlaps into the lines. As a
result the settings must be appropriate in order to ensure that the protection does not
operate for faults in this overlapping area until the primary relays assigned to that area
have had the opportunity to clear the fault. The process of setting is called coordination or
selectivity. Phase and ground fault relays must coordinated. The phase relays are set
according to the three-phase fault data and maximum short time load or transient inrush.
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The ground relays are set according to the single phase to ground fault data and the
maximum zero sequence load unbalance. In addition, fuses are involved in the
coordination process, since they provide phase and ground fault protection. However,
they receive only the line currents and the ground relays operate on 3I0 currents. In
general, fuses are applied to radial systems where the line current is equal to 3I0
Nevertheless, fuses cannot be applied to loop systems where the faulted phase current is
not equal to 3I0 . Eventually, the coordination of relays and fuses becomes more
complicated where the ground relays are set more sensitively. If we have ground relays
being coordinated without the fuses, then we are dealing with a normal situation. If we
include the fuses in the coordination process, then we require to raise the ground relay
setting to that essentially equivalent to the phase relays.

1.5 Primary and backup
As I said before, our aim is to set the protection to operate as fast as possible for faults in
the primary zone, yet delay enough for faults in the backup area. All power systems
contain many subsystems and each subsystem and component is responsible for the
removal of a fault. The primary protection systems are considered the systems that are
primarily responsible for the removal of the fault as soon as possible while the losses are
kept at minimum. However, sometimes the system's primary protection components fail to
operate, and we have the so called backup protection which is responsible to cover the
primary system's failure and clear the fault. The following example will illustrate the
operation of the backup protection.

5

Figure 1.2 Basic backup protection system.

In figure I.2 we have a basic protection scheme where backup protection is involved.
Assume we have a fault at point Flt. Circuit breakers C and D must open in order to
protect line 2-3. This is the primary protection system. Suppose the primary protection
system at bus 2 has failed to operate. This failure must be recognized from the rest of the
protection system in order to clear the fault at point Flt. The circuit breakers A, E and H
must be tripped and the protection systems at buses 1, 4 and 6 must provide a backup
protection for the primary protection system at bus 2 for line 2-3. In addition, the backup
protection is a primary protection for line sections 1-2, 4-2 and 6-2. The operation of a
remote backup system removes a far greater portion of the power system from service
than does the operation of the primary protection system. The service to any loads that
may be connected at buses 1, 4, and 6 may be affected, and there will be no service to
bus 2. Moreover, the backup system must allow a sufficient time for the primary
protection system to function normally. The backup system is made slower-acting by
inserting a delay between the maximum time for fault clearing by the primary system,
and the fastest possible response of the backup system. The inserted delay is called
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coordination time delay. Moreover, this is the time solution to the protection problem. In
addition to the time solution, there is the so called communication solution.

Figure 1.3 Communication is established between the distance relays, when an internal or external fault
is occurred.

In figure 1.3 we have a communication example of the distance relays. In case of
an internal fault (Flt-1) or an external fault (Flt-2), the relays at bus 1 indicate the
direction of the power flow or the relative phase angle information whether the fault is
external or internal. This information is communicated through channel to the relays at
bus I. Similarly, the relays at bus I communicate with the relays at bus 2. (ctl, ct2, ct3
and ct4 are current transformers). If the fault is in the primary zone (Flt-1), then both
relays at 1 and 2 operate together at high speed. The communication process can be done
through fiber optics cables which is a temporary technology in the communication area.
The communication solution is part of the pilot relaying, a topic that I will examine in
the next sections.
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1.6 Types of relays
In this section, we are going to examine some of the basic types of relays that are used
for the protection of the power lines. The distance relay is the main relay that we have to
consider in our protection applications. The distance relays are mainly used for primary
and backup protection on transmission and subtransmission lines where there is
high-speed relaying and the voltage is above 34.5 kV.
The distance relay has its principle of operation based on the ohmic relays that
use voltage and current inputs to provide an output signal if there is a fault within a
certain distance from the relay. The distance is calculated according to a signal that is
proportional to the voltage-to-current ratio that is the impedance, or according to a signal
that is proportional to the imaginary component of the voltage-to-current ratio that is the
reactance, or according to a signal that is proportional to the current-to-voltage ratio that
is the admittance to the fault. One of the major advantages of the distance relay is that it
responds to the system's impedance instead of the magnitude of the current. Therefore,
the distance relay has a fixed distance reach.
A common type of distance relays is the electromechanical-distance relay that
utilizes an induction cup in order to achieve operating times of I-I.5 cycles. Another
type is the static distance relay that utilizes an operating time of 0.25-0.5 cycles. The
characteristics of the distance relays can be shown in terms of two variables, R and X or
sometimes in terms of Z and 0. (R is the resistance, X is the reactance, Z is the
impedance and 0 is the angle by which current lags voltage). R-X diagrams can show the
relay characteristics and the line impedance, helping us to analyze the protection scheme.
We have to mention that regions of positive R and X represent impedance in a defined

8

tripping direction and the regions of negative R and X represent the nontripping direction.
Some figures are shown to understand the essence of the R-X diagrams.
Let's examine the reactance type distance relay. These relays measure the reactive
component of the system complex impedance. Figure 1.4 shows us the generic reactance
relay characteristic which appears on the R-X diagram as a straight line parallel to the
R-axis.

Figure 1.4 R-X diagram for the generic reactance relay.

Operation of the generic reactance relay occurs when the reactance from the relay to the
point of fault, X2, is less than or equal to the reactance X1. The relay responds to any
reactance in the negative direction and it is also nondirectional.
The most important relays for line protection, are the time-overcurrent and
instantaneous overcurrent relays. These are the most commonly used relays and they are
used as primary and backup protective devices. The time-overcurrent relay is selected to
give a desired time delay tripping characteristic versus applied current, whereas
instantaneous overcurrent relays are selected to provide high speed tripping (0.5-2 cycles).
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The instantaneous overcurrent relays have been used for a long time in the
protection scheme. The relay operation is based on the electromagnetic attraction and
induction cylinder type. In recent years, solid-state overcurrent relays have become
available and their characteristics are very similar to the electromagnetic relays except that
solid-state relays provide faster reset times.
Another type of relays that is also very common in the protection, is the induction
type time-delay overcurrent relay. This relay has its principal based on alternating current
watt-hour meters and it provides different time-current characteristics, depending on
differences in electrical and mechanical design. The basic components of the relay are the
induction disk which is mounted on a rotating shaft There is the moving contact that is
fastened to the shaft. An electromagnet is also there in order to provide an operating
torque to the disk. Basically, in order for the smooth operation of design and settings, the
relay has two adjustments, the pickup current tap and the time dial. The pickup current is
calculated by a series of discrete taps that are appointed in several current ranges. The
time dial setting determines the initial position of the moving contact when the coil current
is less than the tap setting. The setting controls the time necessary for the relay to close its
contacts. The relay has an inverse time characteristic. Therefore, the relay operates slowly
on small values of current above the tap setting. However, as the current increases, the
time of operation decreases as well. If the current continues to increase, the time delay will
become a constant value due to saturation of the electromagnet. The following graph, in
figure 1.5, shows us different time-current curves that can be obtained by modifications of
electromagnetic design.
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Figure 1.5 Typical curves for overcurrent relays.

The pilot-wire relays are also very important for the protection of the power lines.
There are cases where lines should be capable of carrying maximum emergency load
currents for any period of time and they should be removable from service quickly. The
pilot-wire relay is capable of providing the right response to a situation like before. The
pilot- wire relay is a type of differential relay and it operates on the principle of comparing
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the conditions at the two ends of the line. The relays are being connected to operate if the
comparison indicates a fault in the line. All the fault information is transmitted through
terminals over a pilot-wire circuit. However, since the pilot-wire relay is a differential
relay, the relaying scheme does not provide protection for faults of adjacent section of
lines and buses.
Finally, the distance relays are considered to be the most important protective
devices for power line protection. As I mentioned before, the distance relays measure
voltage and current, and the ratio is expressed in terms of impedance. This impedance is
an electrical measure of the distance along a transmission line from the relay location to a
fault. The measuring element is instantaneous in action, with time delay provided by a
timer element so that the delay, after operation of a given measuring element, is constant.
In a typical transmission line application, three measuring elements are provided. The first
operates only for faults within the primary protection zone of the line and trips the circuit
breaker without intentional time delay. The second element operates on faults in one
adjacent or backup protection zone and initiates a tripping after a short time delay. The
third element is set to include more remote zone and to trip after a longer time delay. The
distance relays are more preferred in cases where changes in operating conditions cause
wide variations in magnitudes of fault current, and where load currents may be large
enough, in comparison with fault currents. In general, there are three main types of
distance relays. The first one is the impedance-type which is used in phase-fault relaying
for moderate length lines. The second type is called mho-type and it is used in phase-fault
relaying for long lines or where severe synchronizing power surges may occur. Finally the
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third type is called reactance type and it is used in ground-fault relaying and phase-fault
relaying on very short lines and lines of such physical design that high values of fault arc
resistance are expected to occur. In addition, the reactance-type relays are used in systems
where severe synchronizing power surges are not a factor.
There is no doubt that the system and equipment protective devices guard the
power system from the threat of damage caused by overcurrents and transient
overvoltages that can result in equipment loss and system failure. The coordination of the
protective devices is one of the most important operation during design of a protection
scheme. During the next chapter we will see how the coordination of the relays works and
how we can improve their operation.

CHAPTER TWO
PROTECTION COORDINATION
2.1 Coordination scheme
In this chapter, I will take a closer examination of the protection coordination and analyze
the loop line setup since Cyprus power system has a loop form. Like every other
protection scheme, our aim is to set the protection to operate as fast as possible so that we
can avoid any damage to our systems. Moreover, the protection should be responsible for
the backup areas, therefore a proper delay for any faults should be inserted. The first thing
we need to assume is a minimum fault current which should be able to operate all the
protective devices. On the other hand, we have to consider the other extreme where we
have maximum fault current during the peak-load periods. There are some cases where we
have to take into account the possible margins according to the requirements of the relays'
operation. Nevertheless, coordination is a process that requires trial and error. For
instance, lines and feeders are to have the right coordination by plotting the time-current
characteristics on a log paper and shifting the points until the right requirements are met.
The loop systems require a more complicated procedure since the current in the relays
being coordinated will be different for the fault. Therefore in such a case, we use
coordination charts. The following figures shows an example of line protection.

Figure 2.1 Sections of protection.
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Figure 2.2 Delay setup.

Figure 2.3 Coordination with instantaneous overcurrent and inverse time units.

Figure 2.1 shows the currents that are necessary for setting the relays at point A and
circuit breaker 2, in order to protect line section AB. Figure 2.2 shows the coordination
with instantaneous overcurrent and inverse time units. The "delay", that is shown in the
figure, is the actual time interval between primary and remote backup protective devices.
That time interval is a delay that is required for the relays at circuit breaker 2, station A, to
permit breaker 4 relays at station B to clear the faults in line BC. Typical values for the
delay are in between 0.2 and 0.5 s for electromechanical units. The clearing time for a fault
is typically 0.033 to 0.133 s. Figure 2.3 shows the coordination with directional distance
relays.
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2.2 Loop system
In a loop system, the fault currents are coming from all terminals. A line could be a feeder
type for positive and negative sequence but a loop for zero sequence. The circuit may
have a power source at one end but be grounded at both ends. In addition, a line could be
a loop type for positive and negative sequence but a feeder type for zero sequence. Since
we have a multiple fault current sources, the coordination of the loop system is rather
complicated. Let's take a look at an example of loop system in order to realize the
protection concept. Figure 2.4 illustrates a loop system.

Figure 2.4 Loop system setup.
In figure 2.4, we have a typical loop system where the settings will be made for the phase
relays. Setting ground relays for the system is similar using phase-to-ground fault data and
relay pickup values. The taps should be one half or less of the phase relay taps.
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The directional time-overcurrent relays are being set for the circuit breakers at 1,
2, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 8. If we take the relays around the loop clockwise, we have the following
coordination scheme: Relays at 2 must coordinate with relays at 5 and 7. Relays at 7 must
coordinate with relays at 8 and I2. Finally, relays at 8 must coordinate with relays at 1,2,
and 3. If we take the relays counterclockwise, with the following coordination scheme:
Relays at 4 must coordinate with relays at 9 and I. Relays at 9 must coordinate with relays
at 5 and 6. Relays at 6 must coordinate with relays at 1,3, and 4. We see that the loops are
not independent with each other. The setting in both are dependent on the settings of the
relays on other circuits from the several buses.
Our purpose is to set the relays around the loop. Therefore, we have to determine
the settings and operating times for these relays. However, if we assume the settings for
the relays, we make life a little easier. The phase relay at breaker I, should not exceed
0.06s. We use typical times and 0.06s is an appropriate value to assume. A pilot relay
could be used on this short line. The relay at breaker 5, is to have a maximum operating
time 0.24 s, for fault at F4 . The relay at breaker 10, is to have an operating time 0.18 s,
for fault F7 . Finally, the relay at breaker 3, is to have an operating time 0.2I s , for fault
FA. The next step is to try to set each relay to operate in less than 0.2 s for the close in
fault and at least 0.2 plus the delay time interval for the far-bus fault. The protection of the
remote busses, requires relay operating time greater than 0.2 s and the setting should be
that maximum time plus the delay interval. We usually assume the delay interval to be
equal to 0.3 s. We see that the timing of the whole set-up should be made with a very
careful way. The time dial setting is the most important setting of the overcurrent relays.
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We have to select the right relay tap in order to have the right coordination of the relays.
We get the time dial settings from curves that usually provided by the relay companies.
Manufacturer's printed time-current curves show the relay operating times for a full range
of time dial settings and multiples of tap current applied to the relay. Time-overcurrent
relays are available with many different current ranges and tap settings. The following
table shows typical tap ranges and settings.
Table 2.1 Typical Tap Ranges and Settings

TAP RANGE

TAP SETTING

0.5-2.5 or 0.5-2.0

0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2 , 1.5, 2.0,
2.5

0.5-4.0

0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.5,
2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0

1.5-6.0 or 2.0-6.0

1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, 5.0,
6.0

4.0-16.0 or 4.0-12.0

4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 10.0, 12.0,
16.0

1.0-12.0

1.0, 1.2, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5,
4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 10.0, 12.0

Let's go back to our example in figure 2.4. The coordination process we can draw in one
diagram, that is figure 2.5.

Figure 2.5 The coordination process.
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If we take out the genarators at buses B and C, in order to achieve minimum condition,
there is no current flow through the breakers 8 and 6 for any far faults. However, this
changes after the far-bus relays 2 or 4 open and we have line faults from points F2 and F3.
We have to make sure that the relays can respond to these line faults otherwise they will
not be possible to be cleared. Our case is what we called a single loop operation.
However, in real life there are several cases where several separate load areas exist. The
advantage is that any one line circuit can be removed with service available to all the
loads. The system in figure 2.4, the relays at breaker 6 do not need to coordinate with the
relays at 1, 3 and 4 since they do not have current for fault FA. Similarly, relays at 8 do
not need to coordinate with relays at 1, 3 and 2. The faults at F3 and F4 can be detected
only after breaker 2 or 4. Load currents into the lines could be zero unless there are other
line taps. Therefore, we can apply directional instantaneous relays at breakers 6 and 8 and
we should set them very sensitively and below the line faults. This provides high-speed
operation for the terminals.
In reality, we have to give emphasis to the possibilities of various lines that are out
of service and other possible operating conditions. Therefore, it is wise to set all the relays
to provide complete backup protection over all the adjacent remote lines. In our example,
the relays at breaker 2 should be able to provide protection for faults to bus C and at load
at breaker 5. However, we might not have success to this protection scheme since the
infeed of fault current by the source at bus B tends to reduce the fault current through
breaker 2 for faults on line BC and at bus B.
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In addition, there is the case where an instantaneous trip application is necessary
for a loop system. The fault current could exist between the close-in and far-bus faults and
instantaneous units should be utilized in order to provide fast protection for faults out on
the line. For instance, the system in figure 2.4, an instantaneous unit at relays 2 must be set
to a value which is the maximum far-bus fault current multiplied by a factor greater than
unity. This gives a sufficient coverage for the line compared to the close-in fault. The
instantaneous trip units supplement the time-overcurrent protection to provide fast
operation over part of the line sections.
However, these units, in some cases offer limited protection for the maximum fault
condition and none for minimum faults. Therefore, their application becomes marginal
from a protection point of view. Still, they can provide fast clearing for the heaviest
close-in faults and for the non-directional type, the total cost increases very little.
The operating times of the time-over-current relays can be reduced with
instantaneous units by coordinating at their pickup point rather than at the far bus,
although, this becomes more difficult where the instantaneous unit reach varies
considerably from system changes.

2.3 Phase fault distance protection
The distance protection for phase fault is applied mostly for lines at 69 kV and above. In
this case, we are able to have a fixed reach as a function of the protected line impedance,
something that is advantageous. Moreover, we have the ability to operate for fault
currents near or less than maximum load current and minimum to no transient overreach.
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In our protection scheme, first we have to define at least two zones that are necessary for
primary protection. Both zones have to operate simultaneously, but one zone should be
delayed by a time delay, the so called CTI, in order to provide coordination. However, it is
wise to use a third zone in the protection scheme to apply backup protection of the remote
lines.
The following method is a common practice in the United States and it utilizes
separate distance units for the several protection zones. This is in contrast to distance
relays that use a single distance measuring unit initially set for zone I reach. If we have a
fault persistence, then we extend the reach by switching to zone 2 after T2 delay, then
after T3 to zone 3. On one hand, separate units provide the comfort of redundancy since
for faults in the zone 1 primary reach area, all three distance units will operate. Thus zones
2 and 3 are backup for failure of the zone 1 unit. On the other hand, the switched types do
not provide this backup but they are more economical.

Figure 2.6 Zones and typical settings of distance relays.
The zones and typical settings are shown in figure 2.6. In this figure we see the zones at
several locations. Typically, zone 1 is set for 90% of the positive sequence line impedance,
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zone 2 approximately 50% into the next adjacent line, and zone 3 approximately 25% into
the adjacent line beyond. Zones 2 and 3 provide backup for all adjacent lines at operating
times of T2 and T3.

Figure 2.7 Operating circles of protected zones (R-X diagram).

In figure 2.7, we have a diagram that shows the operating circles for the three zones at bus
A, breaker 1 and at bus b, breaker 2, plotted on the R-X diagram. The several lines are
shown at their respective r+jx positions. The relays operate when the ratio of fault voltage
to current falls within the circles. Load impedance falls in the areas shown. We have to
note that the operating circles must be set so as not to operate on any system swings from
which the system can recover. Such swings occur after a system disturbance, such as
faults, sudden loss of generation, or load, or from switching operations.
Zone 1 at each end of the line provides the most desirable protection that is
simultaneous protection high speed operation for the middle 80% of the line section. This
can be increased to 100% only with pilot relaying.
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As far as backup protection is concerned, we have the following typical example
shown in figure 2.8.

Figure 2.8 Backup protection example.
The relays at breaker 1, bus A protecting line AB look into lines BC and BD extending
from bus B. Let's make the following assumptions: Line BC is short and line BD is long,
zone 2 set for 50% of line BC will cover only a small percentage of line BD. If we set line
BD for 50%, it will overreach and will not coordinate with Z2 of line BC unless T2 time is
increased. However, due to the "infeed effect", the reach will not be as far as indicated.
Fault current from other lines will cause relays at 1 to under reach. This effect can be seen
by considering a solid three-phase fault at F. With VF= 0, the relays at 1 receive current
I,3, but the bus A voltage is the drop

Relay 1 sees the following

impedance:

As a result, if relay 1 is set to a value of the actual impedance of the previous equation, it
would not see fault F. In other words, relay 1 "under reaches" as a result of the fault
contributions from other lines connected to bus B. Setting the relays for the apparent
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impedance value has the danger of overreaching and miscoordination when the infeeds are
removed or changed by operation.

2.4 Tapped and multiterminal lines
The following two figures show illustrate typical distance relay applications for tapped and
multiterminal lines.

Figure 2.9 Relay application for tapped lines.

Figure 2.10 Relay application for multiterminal lines.
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As we see in figure 2.9, the tap at point B could be a transformer at or near the line, so
that ZBD is the impedance from the tap plus the transformer impedance. The tap may serve
as load, therefore very small amount of current is supplied through it to the line faults, or
it may tie into a fault source at D. Figure 2.10 shows another illustration of tapped lines.
In the case of figure 2.9, zone 1 should be set for k times the lowest actual impedance to
any remote terminal, or for k times the lowest apparent impedance to any remote terminal
for the case in figure 2.10. k is less than 1, usually 0.9. Zone 2 should be set for a value
greater than the largest impedance, actual or apparent, to the remote terminals. Moreover,
the zone timer T2 must be set so as not to cause wrong operation when any terminal is out
of service to cause the distance unit to overreach.
However, the previous settings can make primary protection very difficult and
limited as well. In figure 2.9, let's assume that the tap at point B is very close to point A,
so nZAC is small and (1-n)ZAC is large with ZBD very small. Then zone 1 at breaker I, bus A
must be set at 90% of (nZAB+ZBD), which is a very small value compared with (1-n)ZAB.
Therefore, high-speed coverage of the line is almost negligible. On the other hand, if the
tap is a load transformer where ZBD is high relative to ZBC, zone 1 at breakers .1 and 2 can
be set for 90% of the line to provide good high speed protection.
If B is a load tap in figure 2.9, with negligible current to line faults, distance relays
are not applicable at breaker 3, as opening breaker I and 2 terminates the line fault. There
is trouble detecting the faults, if the impedance to a line fault from bus D is very large and
approaches infinity.
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In figure 2.10, current can flow out D terminal for an internal line fault near the C
bus. Thus distance or directional relays at breaker 3 see the internal fault as external for no
operation until after breaker 2 has opened.
Therefore, protection of tapped and multiterminal lines is more complex and
requires specific data on the line impedances, location and type of tap or terminal, and
fault data with current distributions for the various system and operating conditions. Most
often, except for small transformer load taps, these types of lines are protected best by
pilot relaying.

CHAPTER THREE
RELAY COORDINATION OF CYPRUS POWER SYSTEM
3.1 Circuit examination
In this chapter, I am going to examine Cyprus power system which is a small power
system. The system belongs to the loop category which I examined in chapter two. The
following figure shows the general system layout.

Figure 3.1 Cyprus power system in a simplified form.

Figure 3.I shows the reduced form of the power system since we are interested in a
general view of the protection. First, I am going to determine the time coordination of the
relays and then give a better solution for the line protection of the above system. The
system has to be divided into the protection zones that are easier to work with. We take
each zone separately. The following figure shows the suggested zones of protection.
26

27

Figure 3.2 Protection zones and loops of Cyprus power system.
The power system can be divided into three main loops. However, I am examining
the two major loops ABCDEFA and ABCGHIJA that are discussed separately. The
transmission line data could be considered as well as the length of each conductor. Table
3.1 gives us the necessary information.
Loop ABCDEFA.
This loop includes four generator buses: Moni 66(A), Moni 13 (F), Dhekelia 66 (C), and
Dhekelia I32(D). Actually, these are all the generator buses of the whole power system.
The coordination has to be made according to typical settings for the phase relays. The
phase-to-ground fault data and relay pickup values are used to set the ground relays for
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Table 3.1 This table shows the length of the conductors and the per unit impedances on 100MVA base.
RI

X1

5.5

2.15E-3

5.32E-3

36.7

2.04E-2

6.67E-3

Athalassa132-Dhekelia132

28

4.6E-3

3.215E-2

Athalassa66-Dhekelia66

21

1.521E-1

1.625E-1

Athalassa66-Nikitas Tee

27.8

Nikitas Tee-Karvounas

21.9

2.62E-1

3.457E-1

Karvounas-Polemidia

21

3.154E-1

3.386E-1

Paphos-Episkopi

29

4.603E-I

4.686E-1

Episkopi-Kolossi

3.9

3.057E-2

3.054E-2

Kolossi-Polemidia

3.5

2.403E-2

2.72E-2

Polemidia-Paphos

35.6

7.67E-2

2.623E-1

Moni66-Polemidia

14.4

3.085E-2

1.068E-1

Moni66-New Mari

8.5

1.665E-2

6.245E-2

2

3.17E-2

3.15E-2

1.1

1.73E-2

1.74E-2

Pyrgos-Dhekelia66

39.1

6.176E-1

6.315E-1

Dhekelia132-Larnaca

11.4

6.2E-3

2.08E-2

Dhekelia 132-Protaras

16.8

8.37E-2

3.13E-2

Circuit
Athalassa132-District Office
Athalassa132-Moni132

Moni66-Pyrgos
Pyrgos-Moni Cement

Length
(miles)

6.875E-2 2.298E-1

the system. The directional time-overcurrent relays have to coordinate in both clockwise
and counterclockwise ways.
Loop clockwise:
• Relays at 21 must coordinate with relays at 19 and 19A.
• Relays at I9 must coordinate with relays at 15 and I6.
• Relays at I5 must coordinate with relays at 1I and 9.
• Relays at 9 must coordinate with relays 6 and 8.
• Relays at 6 must coordinate with relays at 2 and 4.
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• Relays at 2 must coordinate with relays at 21, 22, and 23.
Loop counterclockwise:
• Relays at 1 must coordinate with relays at 3 and 4.
• Relays at 3 must coordinate with relays at 7 and 8.
• Relays at 7 must coordinate with relays at I0 and 1I.
• Relays at 10 must coordinate with relays at 16 and 17.
• Relays at 17 must coordinate with relays at 20.
• Relays at 20 must coordinate with relays at I, 22, and 23.

3.2 Time coordination technique
We notice that the loop is not independent since there are other loop circuits
connected to several buses as well as generator buses. However, we are going to assume
the operating times for relays that are interfaced with the other loop circuits. In the cases
where we have short lines we should use relays with operating time not more than 0.06 s.
For instance, the phase relays breakers at 23, 4 and 16 should have pilot relays with a 0.06
s operating time. The phase relays breaker at 8 has a maximum operating time 0.26 s, the
phase relays breaker at 11 has a maximum operating time 0.19 s and the phase relays
breaker at 22 has a maximum operating time 0.22 s. The operating times are assumed
according to the complexity of the circuits and the length of the conductors that are
involved.

In addition, we have to note that buses A, C, D, and F include

generator-transformer units and they have fast differential protection.

However,

differential protection is a different concept and we only assume the distance protection.
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The relays' setting should be done in such a way so each relay operates in no more than
0.2 s for the close-in fault and at least 0.2 plus the CTI interval when there is a far bus
fault. Let's take breaker 21 as a starting point and start to move clockwise. Buses A and
F are drawn separately in figure 3.3 for convenience reasons.

Figure 3.3 Coordination for section AF.

The currents that are shown in figure 3.3, are the tree phase fault currents. The arrows
indicate the direction of flow and the second arrow has two values. The first value
represents the maximum operating current and the second value represents the minimum
operating current. Here, I have to introduce a very useful graph (figure 3.4) that helps the
calculation of the time dial setting.
Calculation of the time dial setting- coordination or not
First we have to choose the suitable CT' s and a relay tap. The CT's could be 250:5 since
the maximum load is 200 Amps for the specific line section. Therefore, the maximum load
is 200/50 = 4 Amps (secondary). The best relay tap selection is the value 6 because it is
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1.5 times the maximum load and gives a primary fault current pickup of 6X50=300 Amps.

Figure 3.4 Typical inverse-time-overcurrent relay curves.

Relay 21 should have an operating time of 0.12 s plus the CTI value which is 0.3 s.
(0.12+0.3=0.42 s) for fault F3. For a maximum fault F3, a current of 1155.4 Amps goes
through relay 2I. In order to find the multiple of pickup current we divide the maximum
current by the primary fault current pickup which is 300 Amps.

1155.4/300 = 3.85 . The

value of 3.85 in figure 3.4, suggests a time dial setting of 1 and provides an operating time
of 0.68 s. The value of 0.68 s implies coordination since the minimum operating time
value is 0.42 s. For a minimum fault current at F3, we have:

1132 8
. = 3.78 . According
300

to figure 3.4 the value 3.78 and a time dial setting of I imply an operating time of 0.75 s.
In a similar way, we calculate the remainder operating times for relay 2I. For a maximum
5765.
= I9.22). The minimum line-end
300 3
1131.I
fault F2, the operating time is 0.77s (
= 3.77 ).
300
close-in fault F 1, the operating time is 0.16 s (
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3.3 Coordination outlines of first loop
3.3.1 Coordination outline of Moni 66 - Moni 132 (section AF)

MAX LOAD at secondary = 200/50 = 4 A
Select MTVC = 6 (4XI.5) → Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 6X50=300 A
Relay 21 op-time2 for fault F3:
MAX FAULT op-time:

(See what time dial gives

the immediate next op-time value for MTVC=6) 0.68 s. Coordination: YES.
MIN FAULT op-time:

MAX CLOSE-IN FAULT op-time:

MIN LINE-END FAULT op-time:

(implies) 0.75 s

0.51s

0.77s

Figure 3.5 Coordination for section FE.

2
3

Multiple Tap Value Current
Abbreviation for operating times
We choose the right Time Dial according the relay's operating time
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Let's move to the next line section which shown separately in figure 3.5. The FE line
section is one of the longest of the power system (36.7 miles).

Calculation time dial setting - coordination or not
In this case, we note that the current values are higher than the previous line section. In
addition, as far as the load is concerned in this line section, the load factor is higher as
well. The minimum load is 400 Amps. Therefore, we use CT's with a ratio of 450:5. The
secondary load is 400/90=4.44 Amps and it is wise to select a relay tap value of 6 because
it provides a safer margin than a lower value. It is 1.35 times the maximum load and the
primary pickup current is 6X90=540 Amps. Relay 2I, from before, operates at 0.75 s for
a minimum fault F3. Therefore, relay 19 should operate no more than 0.75-0.3 = 0.45 s
for fault F3. Relay 16 should have an operating time of 0.22+0.3=0.52 s for fault F5.
Relay I5 operating time is unknown. The following coordination schematic will give us
the necessary values for the current coordination problem.

3.3.2 Coordination outline of Moni 132 - Athalassa 132 (section FE)
MAX LOAD = 400 A
CT's used: 450:5
MAX LOAD at secondary = 400/90= 4.44 A
Select MTVC = 6 (4.44XI.35) Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 6X90=540 A
Relay 19 op-time for fault F3: 0.75 - 0.3(CTI) = 0.45 s
Relay 19 op-time for fault F5: 0.5I + 0.3 = 0.81 s.
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We notice that the maximum close-in fault operating time is less than the operating time
for relay 16 as far as fault F5 is concerned. Therefore, we do not have coordination. The
solution is to increase the time dial for relay 21, in order to achieve the right operating
times.

The maximum fault operating time for relay 2I, is 0.5 s greater than the operating time for
relay 21. (Close-in fault).
The next section is ED which is shown in figure 3.6. The coordination of this
section is done in a similar way. However, in the actual system we have to consider the
possibilities with various lines out of service. A complete backup protection is usually
suggested when real life is involved. In our examples, we assume the basic condition for a
faulty situation.
4
5

Operating time should not be more than 0.45 s
Operating time should be at least 0.81 s
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Figure 3.6 Coordination for section ED.

3.3.3 Coordination outline of Athalassa 132 - Dhekelia 132 (section ED)
MAX LOAD = 300 A
CT's used: 350:5
MAX LOAD at secondary = 300/70= 4.29 A
Select MTVC = 6 (4.29XI.40) Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 6X70=420 A
Relay 15 op-time for fault F3: 0.79 - 0.3(CTI) = 0.49 s
Relay 15 op-time for fault F5: 0.4± 0.3 = 0.7 s.

We do not have coordination, since the maximum far-bus operating time is less than the
required value which should be at least 0.7 s. Therefore, we have to change the time dial
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of relay 19 in order to change the operating times. A time dial setting of 2.5 would have
the following scheme:
TDNEW=2.5 (for relay 19)
MAX CLOSE-IN FAULT op-time: 0.5 s (MTVC=14.78)
MAX FAULT FAR-BUS op-time: 0.9 s (MTVC=5.52)
0. 9(MAX FAULT FAR-BUS, RELAY 19) - 0.37

(MAX CLOSE-IN FAULT, RELAY 15)

0

. 53 s

The difference in time satisfies the condition that the relay 15 operating time for fault F3
should be at least 0.49 s. Relay 19 is 0.53 s above relay I5. Therefore, coordination is
achieved by setting the time dial to 2.5 for section FE and setting the time dial to 1.5 for
section ED. The rest of the line sections are outlined as well in the following pages.

37

3.3.4 Coordination outline of Dhekelia 132 - Dhekelia 66 (section DC)

Figure 3.7 Coordination for section DC.

MAX LOAD = 200 A
CT's used: 250:5
MAX LOAD at secondary = 200/50= 4 A
Select MTVC = 6 (4X1.5) Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 6X50=300 A
Relay 9 op-time for fault F7: 0.7 - 0.3(CTI) = 0.4 s
Relay 9 op-time for fault F9: 0.37+ 0.3 = 0.67 s.
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3.3.5 Coordination outline of Dhekelia 66 - Pyrgos (section CB)

Figure 3.8 Coordination for section CB.

MAX LOAD= 300 A
CT's used: 350:5
MAX LOAD at secondary = 300/70= 4.29 A
Select MTVC = 6 (4.29X1.4) Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 6X70=420 A
Relay 6 op-time for fault F9: 0.8 - 0.3(CTI) = 0.5 s
Relay 6 op-time for fault F11: 0.39+ 0.3 = 0.69 s.
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3.3.6 Coordination outline of Pyrgos - Moni 66 (section BA)

Figure 3.9 Coordination for section BA.

MAX LOAD= 350 A
CT's used: 400:5
MAX LOAD at secondary = 350/80= 3.38 A
Select MTVC = 5 (3.38X1.48) Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 5X80=400 A
Relay 2 op-time for fault F11: 0.92 - 0.3(CTI) = 0.62 s
Relay 2 op-time for fault F13: 0.49+ 0.3 = 0.79 s.

A

3.4 Coordination outlines of second loop
Loop ABCGHIJA
This loop also includes the generator buses which are the same as before. As a result,
loop ABCDEFA overlaps with loop ABCGHIJA (figure 3.2). Similarly, the coordination
has to be made according to typical settings for the phase relays. The fault data and relay
pickup values are used in order set the ground relays for the system. As before, the
directional time-overcurrent relays have to coordinate in both clockwise and
counterclockwise ways.
Loop clockwise:
• Relays at 22 must coordinate with relays at 31, 33, and 34.
• Relays at 31 must coordinate with relays at 29.
• Relays at 29 must coordinate with relays at 27.
• Relays at 27 must coordinate with relays 25.
• Relays at 25 must coordinate with relays at 6 and 7.
• Relays at 6 must coordinate with relays at 2 and 4.
• Relays at 2 must coordinate with relays at 21, 22, and 23.
Loop counterclockwise:
• Relays at 1 must coordinate with relays at 3 and 4.
• Relays at 3 must coordinate with relays at 7 and 8.
• Relays at 8 must coordinate with relays at 26.
• Relays at 26 must coordinate with relays at 28.
• Relays at 28 must coordinate with relays at 30.
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• Relays at 30 must coordinate with relays at 32, 33, and 34.
• Relays at 32 must coordinate with relays at I, 21, and 23.

The loop is not independent and we have to assume the operating times of the
relays that are interfaced with the other loop circuits. The operating times are assumed
according to the complexity of the circuits and the length of the conductors that are
involved. The relay's setting should be done as before and the relay should operate in no
more than 0.2 s for the close-in fault and at least 0.2 plus the CTI interval (0.3 s) when
there is a far bus fault. Starting point is relay 22. The coordination outlines and figures
are discussed in the following pages. In addition, line sections CB and BA are not
discussed since they were analyzed in the previous loop.
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3.5 Coordination outlines of second loop
3.5.1 Coordination outline of Moni 66 - Polemidia (section AJ)

Figure 3.10 Coordination for section AJ.
MAX LOAD = 300 A
CT's used: 350:5
MAX LOAD at secondary = 300/70= 4.29 A
Select MTVC = 6 (4.29XI.40) Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 6X70=420 A
Relay 22 op-time for fault F1(of previous loop): 0.79 - 0.3(CTI) = 0.49 s
Relay 22 op-time for fault F1(current loop): 0.4+ 0.3 = 0.7 s.

We do not have coordination, since the maximum far-bus operating time is less than the
required value which should be at least 0.7 s. Therefore, we have to change the time dial
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of relay 2 in order to change the operating times. A time dial setting of 2.5 would have
the following scheme:
TDNEW=2.5 (for relay 2)
MAX CLOSE-IN FAULT op-time: 0.5 s (MTVC=14.78)
MAX FAULT FAR-BUS op-time: 0.9 s (MTVC=5.52)
0. 9(MAX FAULT FAR-BUS, RELAY 2) - 0 . 37 (MAX CLOSE-IN FAULT, RELAY 22) = 0. 53 s
The difference in time satisfies the condition that the relay 22 operating time for fault F1I
should be at least 0.49 s. Relay 2 is 0.53 s above relay 22. Therefore, coordination is
achieved by setting the time dial to 2.5 for section BA and setting the time dial to 1.5 for
section AI The rest of the line sections are in the following pages.

3.5.2 Coordination outline of Polemidia - Karvounas (section JI)

Figure 3.11 Coordination for seCtion H.
MAX LOAD = 200 A
CT's used: 250:5
MAX LOAD at secondary = 200/50= 4 A
Select MTVC = 6 (4X1.5) Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 6X50=300 A
Relay 31 op-time for fault F3: 0.7 - 0.3(CTI) = 0.4 s
Relay 31 op-time for fault F5: 0.37+ 0.3 = 0.67 s.
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3.5.3 Coordination outline of Karvounas - Nikitas Tee (section III

Figure 3.12 Coordination for section IH.
MAX LOAD = 300 A
CT's used: 350:5
MAX LOAD at secondary = 300/70= 4.29 A
Select MTVC = 6 (4.29X1.4) Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 6X70=420 A
Relay 29 op-time for fault F5: 0.8 - 0.3(CTI) = 0.5 s
Relay 29 op-time for fault F7: 0.39+ 0.3 = 0.69 s.
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3.5.4 Coordination outline of Nikitas Tee - Athalassa 66 (section HG)

Figure 3.13 Coordination for seCtion HG.

MAX LOAD = 350 A
CT's used: 400:5
MAX LOAD at secondary = 350/80= 3.38 A
Select MTVC = 5 (3.38X1.48) Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 5X80=400 A
Relay 27 op-time for fault F7: 0.92 - 0.3(CTI) = 0.62 s
Relay 27 op-time for fault F9: 0.49+ 0.3 = 0.79 s.
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3.5.5 Coordination outiline of Athalassa 66 - Dhekelia 66 (section GC)

Figure 3.14 Coordiantion for section GC.

MAX LOAD = 400 A
CT's used: 450:5
MAX LOAD at secondary = 400/90=4.44 A
Select MTVC = 6(1.35X4.44) Primary Fault Current Pick-up = 6X90=540 A
Relay 25 op-time for fault F9: 0.95 - 0.3(CTI) = 0.65 s
Relay 25 op-time for fault F11: 0.4 + 0.3 = 0.7 s.
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Line sections CB and BA are covered in the first loop. The two loops that were
analyzed, are the most important loops of the power system. However, the time
coordination of the relays is not absolutely reliable since there are limitations in the relay
protection. Therefore, we could have possible failures. The reliabilty concept is discussed
in the later chapter. In this chapter we saw how adjustments could affect the whole
coordination of the protection scheme. The relay timing is very sensitive and the time
calculations have to be made very accurately in order to achive smooth coordination.

CHAPTER FOUR
RELAY CONTROL AND IMPROVEMENTS
The need for a better protection brought advanced technology into the scheme of relay
protection in order to obtain better system performance and to improve the reliability of
supplies to customers. In some systems, like Cyprus, electromechanical relays are still in
use, although in recent years the old systems are replaced by modern solid-state systems.
Microprocessor-based relays were installed recently and will replace the older types,
particularly in the more complex protection arrangements like distance protection.

4.1 Automation of protection network
The aim of automation is improve the system performance by faster clearance of faults and
restoration of supplies. Automation of protection can be defined in a various ways. The
most common in this area, is the use of automatic tap changers and voltage regulators for
voltage-drop compensation.

With conventional distribution network arrangements any

faulted feeder or line section was traced from the operation of the protection relays, and
accurate location of the fault was not easy. In this case, the fault indicators are devices
that help to locate and isolate the faulted section. The fault indicators are very important
in a power system and their principle of operation is based on indicating the passage of
fault current.
The use of microprocessor-based relays is part of sophisticated protection and
fault-clearing schemes. The microprocessor-based relays are able to measure a number of
input signals to derive the required operating sequence for the specific fault condition, as
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well as having built-in self-checking facilities. The use of microprocessor logic-control
sectionalisers is removing the dependence on staff of the utilities, leading to a quicker
isolation of faults and restoration of supplies. Telecontrolled disconnectors, distributed
around the network, are a further extension of automating system operation to reduce
down time for fault clearance or optimizing network flows to reduce system losses. Using
suitable computer hardware and programs, network configurations can be automatically
rearranged on the occurrence of faults to minimize the consequences of further system
outages.
The advent of telecommunication channels to individual substations made it
possible to provide more instruction codes to more equipment, and to receive information
back on the state of equipment.

Thus, a single relatively low-powered transmitter

operating at a frequency of a few hundred megahertz can provide communication channels
between local control centers and individual substations, and also between a central
control point and several local control centers.
With the two-way facility available, system control and data-acquisition systems,
known as SCADA, can be set up, where not only can instructions be transmitted to
specific items of equipment at every telecontrol substation but also many and varied types
of data can be transmitted to the control center. Circuit-overload and fault data, including
equipment and protection faults, are instantly transmitted to the control center. The
necessary action can then be taken in order to isolate faulty equipment or line sections and
restore the network to a satisfactory configuration. Computer-based SCADA systems
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make it possible to preprogram various system-control operations to minimize down time
in the event of a fault.

4.2 Autoreclosing arrangements
The automatic recloser was developed by arranging for the source circuit breaker to carry
out a variable sequence of tripping and closing by suitable relaying. The tripping can
either by instantaneous, clearing the fault in about 0.2-0.5 s, or be delayed with clearance
times of tens of seconds. Up to four combinations of instantaneous and delayed tripping
are usually available, but generally system arrangements are such that only two
auto-reclosing operations are necessary. Where it is not desirable to install auto-reclosing
on the source breaker, either because it is not suitable for this duty or because the first
section of the feeder is underground cable, a high-speed pole-mounted auto-recloser can
be installed at the beginning of the overhead network.
The automatic sectionaliser is another important equipment that is very important
in the coordination scheme. Figure 4.1 shows a simple application of the automatic
sectionalisers at a section of the Cyprus power system.

Figure 4.1 Use of autoreclosers and sectionalisers. (R: autoreclosing circuit breaker S1, S2: pole mounting
automatic sectionalisers).
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Automatic sectionalisers S are provided on a number of spur feeders in order to isolate
any faulted branch during the dead time of the delayed automatic recloser at the substation
R. A sectionaliser is not capable of breaking fault current, but may be closed on to a fault.
It therefore requires a device to count the number of passages of fault current on the
feeder as the recloser goes through its preset sequence of opening and closing operations.
After registering a preset number of fault current pulses, the sectionaliser opens within the
dead time of the recloser, to isolate the faulted section of the line without breaking fault
current. The whole sequence is shown in figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2 Time diagram of sectionalisers. (01, 02, 03: circuit breaker opens
HSR: high speed automatic reclosing
DR1/DR2: delayed automatiC reclosing)

The sequence is covering the case of a fault on a spur feeder connected to the main feeder
by an automatic sectionaliser. For a transient fault, when the recloser restores supplies,
the sectionaliser sensing devices note that only load current is flowing and return the
sectionaliser to its normal state.
Sectionalisers can also be activated by voltage, usually obtained on the source side
of the unit. Operated in this manner, the device is also suitable for systems where earth
fault currents are limited. In figure 4.3, we see that if the fault is not cleared following a
high-speed auto-reclosure on the feeder circuit breaker R, the automatic sectionalisers S I,
S2, S3 are opened when no voltage is present, as in the sequence of closing and tripping
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shown in figure 4.4. When the voltage reappears after a delayed reclosure, the
sectionalisers are closed after the other in sequence, in accordance with their time-delay
settings.

Figure 4.3 Voltage-controlled sectionalising arrangement with 20 s time delay setting.

Figure 4.4 Voltage-controlled sectionalising operating sequence.

When the sectionaliser immediately upstream of the fault position is closed, in this
case S2, the circuit breaker at the substation will open if the fault still exists. After a
further high-speed reclosure all the sectionalisers will be opened again. The sectionaliser
protecting the fault, S2, is now locked open and all the other sectionalisers are closed in
sequence to restore supplies now that the faulted section is isolated from the system.

54

For all these sectionaliser operations, the isolated spur is not automatically
identified at the control center, and this may therefore result in an extended outage time.
However, the use of fault-passage indicators can assist in locating the faulty section.
Furthermore, telecontrolled switches can avoid such situations. Such an arrangement is
also relevant where sectionalisers revert from telecontrolled to automatic operation during
periods when there is no human presence.

4.3 Digital Protection
Digital protection of power life is a new technique that is replacing the distance
protection. In the case of parallel transmission lines, distance protection encounters some
problems due to mutual coupling, back feed, in-feed, and poor discrimination between the
faulty and healthy line especially in the case of faults near the far end bus. The directional
relays, that are used in distance protection, are operating based on the voltage and
direction of the current. This type of relays have difficulties of operation in the case of
series compensated lines where the voltage and current direction may be reversed.
However, there is the transverse directional protection, that is able to switch off the faulty
line, can eliminate some of the problems of the simple directional protection.
Nevertheless, by switching off the power line, could block the whole protection and
special relays of complicated design is needed in order to ensure the stability of the
protection.
The digital technique seems to be a better solution since the protection scheme can
utilize a single relay at each end in the case of parallel transmission lines. (See figure 4.5)
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Figure 4.5 Parallel transmission lines, using one relay at each end.

The idea is the following: When the impedance of each circuit of a set of parallel lines is
equal, the total current is distributed equally among all circuits under normal conditions
and in the presence of an external fault. In the presence of a fault on one of the parallel
lines, a larger amount of current from the source passes along the faulty line, while the
healthy line carries a smaller current. By comparing the magnitudes of currents in the
corresponding phases, the relay should be able to detect the faulted line correctly. In the
digital form, the comparison can be made by comparing the magnitudes of the samples of
current in the corresponding phases. However, this method is valid only in the case of
permanent faults of any type under the condition that the two lines are identical and are
fed from both ends. The method still has some problems such as phase shift between the
currents may cause incorrect selection of samples. The digital approach of line protection
is being improved by M. Gilany, 0. Malik, and G. Hope, the three professors from the
University of Calgary. They were able to modify the digital method by adding a new
sample to the method. The new sample is a quantity proportional to the average of the
current in each phase which is derived from the magnitude of the samples. They also filter
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the samples before processing since the high frequencies in the current samples may cause
errors in the comparison between the two lines. We see that advanced digital signal
processing is introduced to the power scheme and the older method of coordination of
distance relays could be eliminated in the long run. The digital approach can provide fast
tripping times like 4 ms that belongs to the ultra high-speed relay category.

4.4 Directional comparison protection
The directional comparison protection is an improved power line protection that has the
ability to detect high resistance fault, a fast operating time, a wide application range, and
an improved performance in the presence of distorted waveforms. In addition, this
protection can withstand heavy circuit loading, it can remain stable against power swings
and distortion caused by CT saturation. As far as the distance protection is concerned, the
function of the distance zone is to provide an under-reaching instantaneous protection that
can be used to trip the line for close-in internal faults without depending on the
communication link. The communication link in many protection system is very important
since it is responsible for the operation of the distance relays. If for some reason the
communication link fails, the protection operation fails as well.

The directional

comparison protection offers a way that eliminates the communication link. The zone can
be time delayed and set to over-reach the remote feeder-end, thus providing back-up
protection to the whole feeder.
The operating principle is based on the directional elements that use the fault
generated changes in the voltage and current signals at the relay location, referred to as
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the superimposed signals, to determine the direction to a fault. Figure 4.6 shows the
relationship between the superimposed and the post-fault circuit.

Figure 4.6 Superimposed and post-fault circuits.

The fault voltage can be considered to consist of two parts; the unfaulted voltage plus the
superimposed voltage. Similarly, the fault current consists of the unfaulted current plus
the superimposed current.
There is the following relationship between the superimposed voltage and current
signals. For forward faults, the magnitude and angle of the superimposed current (Air) is
related to the superimposed voltage (∆vt) by the source impedance behind the relaying
point
Therefore.

For a reverse fault:
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Zs is the effective source impedance corresponding to the protected line plus the source at
the remote line. The polarity change between the forward and reverse faults show that a
directional measurement exists. The signals required for comparison are the superimposed
voltage phase delayed by an angle equal to the angle of the source impedance.

These

signals are of opposite polarity for a forward fault and vice a versa for a reverse fault,
giving a very clear basis for directional discrimination. The magnitude of the source does
RR and ∆ ir are of opposite
vr
not affect the polarity relationship. For a forward fault ∆vr<ϕ
polarity and for a reverse fault they are of like polarity. This comparison is performed by
mixing ∆vr<ϕR and Air in accordance with:

<-ϕR-∆ir
term (∆
For a forward fault, since the magnitude of the difference
+∆irthan that of the sum term (∆
greater

),

) is

(S2-S1)<-ϕ
is positive. Likewise, for a

reverse fault (S2-S1) is negative.
The distance protection is improved by the directional comparison method. As I
mentioned before, the transmission lines are tripped without the dependence of the
communication link. The relay incorporates one complete zone of distance protection and
a switch-onto-fault (SOTF) detector.

The SOTF detector is required to provide

instantaneous protection of the whole line during manual or auto-reclosure of the circuit
breaker. The distance zone and the SOTF detector are based on a digital version of a
conventional amplitude comparator and operate when:
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where V is the filtered fault voltage and IZ is the filtered fault current multiplied by the
reach impedance.

4.5 Solid state directional protection
The block diagram that is outlined on figure 4.7, shows the solid state protection layout.
The main features of the scheme are described below.

Figure 4.7 Relay block diagram for solid state protection.
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The input voltage and current signals are converted to electronic signal levels by voltage
and current transformers housed within the relay. These signals are then filtered by analog
pre-filters designed to prevent aliasing distortion during digital processing.

The

pre-filtered voltage and current signals are sampled at a rate determined by the frequency
track algorithm. These sampled values are then converted by a 12 bit analog to digital
converter (A/D) into an equivalent digital number.

The A/D converter output

corresponding to an input current of 36.7 Amps peak (1 Amp relay) or an input voltage of
174 Volts peak is 2048 digital levels.
The frequency track algorithm adjusts the sample rate in accordance with the
power system frequency; the relays samples each of the six relay input signals at exactly 50
samples/power frequency cycle.
The current filter attenuates high frequency transients in the current signal. The
voltage filter is designed to phase delay the voltage signal with respect to the filtered
current signal by the replica source angle. This filter also attenuates the high frequency
transients generated

by the fault;

these

transients may

interfere with the

directional/distance decision.
The phase-phase mixing algorithm derives voltage and current signals, formed as
the difference of the a and b, b and c, a and a phase values respectively. The use of a
phase-phase signal reduces the effect of mutual coupling on double circuit lines.
The superimposed signals are extracted by subtracting a one cycle delayed version
of each signal from its non-delayed signal. When a fault occurs the ∆v and Ai extraction
filters transmit the difference between the post-fault and pre-fault signals for a period of
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one cycle after the fault. After this period, the output of an extraction filter is the
difference between the instantaneous post-fault signal and a one cycle delayed post-fault
signal.
There are three independent directional elements corresponding to the three sets of
phase-phase signals (a-b), (b-c), (c-a). Each directional element processes the appropriate
set of superimposed filtered voltage and current signals in accordance with the following
sequence:
• Step 1: The Av sample is scaled relative to the superimposed voltage setting; the
scaled ∆v equals the true Av divided by the voltage setting.
• Step 2: The scaled Av and the Ai samples are mixed to form a composite
phase-phase sample:

(S2-S1) = |∆v - ∆i| - |∆v + ∆i|

• Step 3: If the (S2-S1) sample is positive, it is compared with a positive forward
threshold (27 digital levels). If the sample value is greater than the threshold, the
output decision counter is incremented. This threshold was selected to ensure the
relay will detect all forward faults, causing an rms current change of greater than 0.2
Amps and an rms voltage change of greater than the voltage threshold, within 0.5
power frequency cycles.
• Step 4: If the (S2-SI) sample is negative, it is compared with the negative reverse
threshold (-18 digital levels). If the sample value is more negative than the
threshold, the output decision counter is decremented. This threshold was selected
to ensure the reverse sensitivity is always greater than the forward sensitivity.
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• Step 5: The previous four steps are performed on each ∆v and ∆ i sample pair at a
rate of 25 samples/cycle. If the output decision counter reaches +3 or -3 the
appropriate (a-b), (b-c), (c-a) forward or reverse directional flag is activated. The
maximum allowable decision count is +8 for a forward fault and -8 for a reverse
fault.

These limits are imposed to ensure the relay can change its decision from

reverse to forward or vice versa without an unacceptably long delay.
The function of the phase selector is to evaluate the faulted phases by processing
the three superimposed phase-phase current signals. A single phase to ground fault is
detected if two phase to phase signals exceed a threshold, while the third signal does not.
The faulted phase is the phase involved in the two active signals. For instance, active (a-b)
and (c-a) signals and an inactive (b-c) signal selects an a-ground fault. The threshold is
chosen to ensure the phase selector is more sensitive than the directional/distance
elements, thus all faults that can be detected by the relay are correctly phase selected. In
general, the function of the phase detector is to direct the trip output of the protection to
the correct phase.
The distance protection and the SOTF detector are both implemented using
three-phase to neutral and three phase to phase amplitude comparison distance elements.
The scheme logic has the function to control the protection scheme. The relay provides
several options on the type of protection scheme required by the user, including blocking
or permissive intertripping schemes.

The operating decisions of the three directional

elements, the phase selector, the six distance elements and the SOTF detector are
transferred to the scheme logic.

The scheme logic processes these decisions in
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conjunction with the communication signal received from the remote relay and sets the
appropriate trip action.
Various tests and simulations show that the directional comparison protection
performs very efficiently. It provides high speed operation with a high degree of security
against maloperation. In short, the digital techniques are used in order to implement the
protection, and it is based on the use of superimposed signals. The operation only occurs
under the influence of the power frequency superimposed signals caused by the fault and it
is not affected by the high frequency transients that exist immediately after the fault
occurrence. The relay operating times are about 9 ms which when are used in conjunction
with fast communication channel, the protection scheme satisfies the requirements of high
speed fault clearance times. As far as the protection coordination of the power system is
concerned, the digital protection offer a more reliable way and it eliminates the trouble of
setting relay taps and timings. Only signal processing is the main tool for the smooth
operation of the protection system.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Protection system coordination is a major problem for utilities since it affects most aspects
of transmission and distribution and dramatically impacts transmission and distribution
reliability. The lack of coordination can have far reaching effects, even to the point of grid
disturbance. Computer technology has evolved such that the coordination process has
been replicated, and the means for a system-wide, systematic, analytical solution to
protection system coordination has been achieved. As I implied before, the ultimate
purpose of protection is to provide power system reliability. It might seem that protection
of equipment is the purpose of protection systems, but this misses the global picture. It is
the integrity of the system which is being protected.

5.1 The nature of protection
As I mentioned in chapter one, the immediate area or zone of protection provided by a
protective device is called the primary protection zone. Consideration of the protective
devices on the system is necessary and this process of addressing protective devices on the
system is called coordination. There two aspects to it. First, every device should be the
first to trip for a fault in its primary zone of protection, i.e., the extend of power system
isolation during a fault should be minimized. Second, protective devices should provide
system redundancy, i.e., there should be a backup device which operates when the primary
device fails. The primary device is the device in whose primary protection zone the fault
occurs. The redundancy-producing primary-backup relationship, often called a device

64

65

pair, is function of power system topology, protective device characteristics, and
protection philosophy.
The primary-backup relationship have become complicated and it is responsible for
the nature of networks: any protective device in a network may be involved in multiple
primary-backup relationships. In other words, when a line feeds two others, its protective
device may serve as backup for the primary devices of each of the other lines. With any
type of network, chains of primary and backup relationships, or device pairs, may exist
which result in multiple coordination paths for any device. Typically, one chain of device
pairs will be critical in determining a device setting, and this chain is called the critical
coordination path.
A fault study is part of every effort in protection system coordination. Fault
conditions have been determined defining the span of fault conditions possible in the
primary protection zone. Calculation of these fault levels is known as fault analysis and
includes sorting to determine the relevant faults for primary protection zone settings.
Nevertheless, the backup protection devices are always present. Analysis of the calculated
faults is necessary to determine the fault situations critical for coordination and the
resultant current pairs for each primary-backup relationship. Summarizing then and
considering proper fault analysis, there are two analytical considerations:
• Primary zone protection
• System coordination
Primary zone protection is a local problem whereas coordination is a system problem.
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5.2 A suggestive system analysis
In general, system analysis is defined as a system-wide, systematic, analytical evaluation.
There is no doubt that the protection coordination is a system condition.
coordination must be accomplished on a system-wide basis.

Thus,

The process must be

systematic since random evaluation is insufficient according to certain analysis
requirements.

For example, automated, comprehensive fault calculation techniques

provide a consistent approach to fault analysis. The evaluation must be analytical, but the
explanation is more involved. The following three aspects should be applied during the
study of a problem:

• Analytical solution
• Simulation
• Probabilistic simulation

Analytical solution is a deterministic, closed form, complete evaluation. The solution is
consistent and repeatable, with the same input data providing identical results. Simulation
is an alternative evaluation method where a model of a complete system is exercised for all
possible situations. However, there are some certain situations. The system has to be
implemented as a model and the number of situations must be limited. Simulation is often
used to evaluate one mode of operation versus another. When the number of simulations
becomes too large, there is the probabilistic simulation. It is not a closed solution with all
possibilities analyzed and a large number of occurrences must be involved. Typically, the

67

number of simulations could be very large for a complete test of every situation.
Therefore, we could use a probabilistic distribution from which we could make some
certain judgments. However, the results are not deterministic, but rather a probability of
effect. The coordination problem is not based its solution on simulation and probabilistic
distribution. The solution requires a deterministic approach that is both system-wide and
systematic, i.e., systems analysis of protection coordination.

5.3 Essential Suggestions
The protection philosophy plays an important role for the overall design of a protection
scheme. As I said before, the coordination problem is a function of system topology and
protective device characteristics. Traditionally, coordination is accomplished manually on
a device-pair-by-device-pair basis for the complete power system. However, power
systems suffer modifications and changes. The changeability of the power systems creates
the need for improving the operation of the protection scheme. Some suggestions are the
following:

• Topological contingencies of a network
Day to day operations often include periodic line outages. These occur as a normal part
of system operation. The line outages are not major system changes, but rather occur in
the course of power system operation. These contingencies must be considered during
coordination. Protection settings cannot be such that normal power system operation can
upset the delicate balance of coordination and negatively impact reliability.
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• Periodic coordination reviews
In the long term, power systems do not remain constant; physical changes occur over
time. As a result, periodic evaluation of the protective system is suggested. Appropriate
review periods can be set up, for instance, annual reviews could be the more suitable.
Unless the system is periodically evaluated,

the power system may become

miscoordinated. In addition, the periodic reviews can have side benefits such as the
training of the protection staff.

• Power system modification
Power system modifications are a fact of life. Power system planning monitors the need
for change and seeks to implement the most cost-effective solution to any future service
requirements.

As far as the protection of the power system is concerned, any

modifications may require recoordination of the protection system or even a change in
protective device application. Whenever any power modification is considered, there is a
protection impact immediate to the area of modification, especially the primary zones of
protection. Regardless of the specifics, protective impact is not evaluated, and protection
system changes as a path to accommodate whatever power system change is implemented.
As a result, there are instances of physical miscoordination, i.e., protective devices that
cannot be coordinated over the relevant range of fault situations. However, the problem
could be attacked by considering the number of alternatives increases. Given more
alternatives, greater analysis is necessary to evaluate the protective impact. In addition,
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the comparison of each alternative with the other could lead to the right protection
scheme.

• Protective device optimization
Protective systems should be periodically evaluated for optimum device applicability.
Device applicability must be evaluated from a system's point of view. Fault levels can
change with power system modifications and directionally may be indicated, or an
impedance relay may offer a better solution to the present device.

Similarly, current

transformers may be subject to saturation, or reclosers may require a higher rating.
Special analysis should be emphasized in order to optimize a power system. However,
optimization analysis often have a significant cost and therefore the cost-effectiveness
factor should be considered as well.

• Protective devices outages
Occasionally, in the course of normal power system operation, it becomes necessary to
outage a piece of protection equipment. This can occur for protective device repair or
replacement of input sensing devices such as current or voltage transformers.

Since

protection coordination is based on device pairs (a primary and a backup device), any
outage of a protective device probably disturbs at least two device pairs and at least one
coordination path. Any device may be part of several device pairs and any device pair may
be a part of several critical coordination paths. Protective equipment repair is normal;
some means of accommodating the necessary outages is suggested since protection is
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essential to the integrity of a power system. In addition, some systematic, analytical
means of coordination is needed to effect power system integrity.

• Adaptive relaying of networks
Adaptive relaying is often discussed in terms of sensitivity and selectivity improvement.
Increased selectivity and sensitivity could allow greater power to be transmitted over
current networks. Any application of adaptive relaying to transmission and distribution
networks must address protection system coordination. Indiscriminate setting changes
will reduce system reliability. Adaptive relaying can improve selectivity and sensitivity, by
adjusting settings for temperature and topological changes, but the impact of system
coordination must be addressed. Any device setting change must occur in the context of
the entire protection system, which requires real-time systems-analysis of
protection-coordination capability. Moreover, adaptive relaying affects some
communication among protective devices of the network. In order to maintain reliability,
which is the main reason of system protection, adaptive relaying must have a fallback
setting in case of communication loss.

5.4 Summary
Protection coordination is a must for all utilities. The power system of Cyprus is a small
network and most of the previous suggestions can be applied since the system is
expanding and being modified. In chapter three, we saw the time coordination of the main
line sections of the network. Traditional time coordination is not reliable enough. We
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saw in chapter three that in a case where we do not have time coordination, we have to
alter the previous relay settings in order to achieve the proper coordination. The time
curves and relay tap settings are methods that going to be substituted by modern digital
methods. For instance, the digital directional comparison is a very important method that
is going to be established by most utilities. Automatic reclosers is an economic way of
protecting lines but the high speed protection is an unknown term. Microprocessor-based
relays are the latest items of the protection technology. They provide sophisticated
protection and fault clearing schemes. In addition, some essential suggestions, that are
examined in this chapter, are very important for the smooth operation of a protection
scheme. There is no doubt that protection coordination becomes more complicated in
order to cover the contemporary needs of a power system. Fortunately, computer
technology is evolving such that systems analysis of protection coordination is feasible and
can provide the opportunity to improve power system operational reliability.
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